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Abstract 
This paper explores whether entrepreneurship can help less successful regions 
improve their regional economic situation, without all the benefits which 
entrepreneurship brings being ‘stripped out’ to more successful regions.  The paper 
uses the idea that peripheral regions possess qualities of tradition and 
underdevelopment, and that these help to anchor new firms into these regions, 
resistant to their concentration in core regions.  The paper explores whether particular 
entrepreneurial events can be regarded as ‘densifying’ the regional entrepreneurial 
environment, thereby making a positive contribution to its economic development.  
The paper explores the role of these negative anchors to the entrepreneurial events 
and the densification process by following a sequence of high technology spin out 
firms in the North East of England.  Using a realist methodology attempting to 
interview all the firms within the sequence which could be found, the paper discovers 
that quite positive advantages exist within these negative qualities.  The paper then 
considers whether these processes, such as plant closure, might drive entrepreneurship 
in all regions. 
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Introduction 
Entrepreneurship holds a privileged position in the new theories of regional economic 
development which account for the increasing importance of knowledge capital in 
explaining productivity and competitiveness (Solow, 1994; Gregersen & Johnsen, 
1997).  New paradigms of regional development, stressing learning, flexibility, 
knowledge and networking often assume a dynamism behind which Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs lie as a driving force (Castells, 1996; Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Fontes & 
Coombs, 2001).  By continually innovating and imitating, entrepreneurs prevent rent 
seeking, monopoly exploitation and economic stagnation (Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999).  In finding new combinations of existing assets, new niches and market needs, 
entrepreneurs drive efficiency and raise productivity (Bathelt, 2001).  It is 
unsurprising that the OECD should regard entrepreneurship as ‘central to the 
functioning of market economies’ (1998, p.11). 
Entrepreneurial cultures emerge in particular places over long time periods, and often 
reflect localised social morés and accumulated economic success which are not easily 
replicated elsewhere (inter alia Hobbs, 1991; Hassink, 1992; Hart & Harrison, 1993; 
Wood, 2002).  The role played by entrepreneurs in successful places has been 
empirically established with reference to a very limited number of successful regions 
in which new high-productivity, innovative sectors have emerged. This raises the 
question of whether entrepreneurship can raise productivity in other, less successful 
regions.  Across Europe, Mason (1991) highlighted how similar types of 
deindustrialised economy suffered from low rates of new firm formation, and Cooke 
(1995) could find very few concrete examples where these ‘rustbelt’ economies had 
been able to increase their rates of new firm formation.  Can entrepreneurship play a 
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significant role in revitalising deindustrialised regions, or is entrepreneurship one 
manifestation of a self-reinforcing division between core and peripheral regions 
(Massey, 1995)? 
One insight into this is suggested by Anderson (2000), who uses the idea of a 
peripheral ‘mode of entrepreneurship’ to articulate how entrepreneurship can take 
place in a peripheral region and benefit that region.  His argument is that ‘gravitation 
works to strip out higher order functions from the periphery, investing and reinforcing 
central power’ (Anderson, 2000, p. 94).  Consequently, what remains are ‘left-over 
qualities such as tradition and underdevelopment, those very characteristics that made 
it peripheral in the first place’ (p. 92).  Anderson illustrates his thesis with examples, 
of a Western Isles ferry and a laird’s folly, turned into a heritage excursion and 
gourmet restaurant/ hotel respectively.  Whilst these are clearly new and highly 
entrepreneurial businesses, it is harder to see how they promote regional development 
by increasing the productivity of local knowledge capital. 
The question of how entrepreneurship can benefit less well performing regions is one 
with which new regional development paradigms do not extensively deal.  It is not 
explicitly argued that peripherality prevents entrepreneurship, but there is a territorial 
presumption in that when benefits are created in such less favoured regions, they do 
not last long, and are easily lost from that region.  This suggests a pressing need to 
explore how regions with unfavourable industrial structures engendering low rates of 
entrepreneurship, and with weak stocks of knowledge capital can improve their 
situation through entrepreneurship.  I explore this issue in an old industrial region as a 
type of region weakly endowed with knowledge capital, to examine the extent to 
which entrepreneurship helps to drive regional economic development. 
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In this paper, I focus on one element of the linkage between entrepreneurship and 
territorial productivity, by exploring the link between entrepreneurial events and the 
wider entrepreneurial environment.  I ask the question “how do particular 
entrepreneurial events create enduring assets in a weakly endowed entrepreneurial 
environments?”  One electronics company is linked to the formation of over 40 other 
companies in the North East of England.  Has the sequence of entrepreneurial events 
stimulated the kind of dynamic which will ultimately feed through into improved 
productivity by making the environment more favourable for entrepreneurial events?  
I use the idea of ‘densification’ of a regional entrepreneurial environment to examine 
whether these micro-scale entrepreneurial events and assets can be regarded as 
contributing to something which raises regional productivity more generally.  I argue 
that tradition helps assets to remain, serving as anchors for entrepreneurs to strongly 
embed their new firms in the region, creating new territorial assets on which others 
can draw. 
Development in the periphery: significant change from small steps 
A range of theories of regional economic development which stress the importance of 
innovation and learning have become prominent in recent years (Mackinnon et al., 
2002).  Recent changes in the nature of economic activity has made knowledge capital 
increasingly important as a factor of production (Romer, 1994; Solow, 1994), and 
unlike other production factors, knowledge has increasing returns to scale.  
Productivity growth is increasingly dependent on firms’ abilities to deal with product, 
process and technique innovations.  Where innovation requires incorporation of 
uncodified forms of knowledge, such as tacit knowledge, know-how and embedded 
knowledges, innovation rates are affected by trust and proximity.  Firms are 
increasingly adopting networking organisational forms to bring in these uncodified 
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types of knowledge.  Territories with formal institutions and informal cultures which 
support these networks have a tendency to higher innovation and productivity levels.  
Regions are increasingly regarded as the optimum territorial scale for such institutions 
and cultures, exemplified in theories such as learning regions (Asheim, 1996), new 
regionalism (Morgan, 1997), regional innovation systems (Cooke & Morgan, 1998), 
and new institutionalism (Amin, 1999). 
Although the notion of the entrepreneur is important in these theories, different 
disciplines use the notion of entrepreneur in very different ways.  In orthodox 
economics, entrepreneurs are agents which change economic systems in significant 
ways, often referred to as Schumpeterian entrepreneurs (cf. Schumpeter, 1945).  In 
management and business studies, entrepreneurship is often synonymous with new 
firm formation.  In geography, entrepreneurship is often taken to be a cultural factor 
behind economic development (cf. Harrison & Hart, 1993).  Common to these 
positions is that an entrepreneur is someone who creates a new organisation; the 
creation of this organisation in turn raises regional productivity and competitiveness 
levels. Entrepreneurs have a vital, if implicit, role as active nodes in these territorial 
innovation networks, their activity building new network elements, and destroying 
redundant linkages and nodes.  Building new linkages and assets creates additional 
network capacity, whilst creative destruction prevents lock-in to negative 
development trajectories (Grabher, 1993). 
Territorial differences in entrepreneurship are a ‘product of a wide variety of social, 
cultural, political and economic factors which are both interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing’ (Mason, 1991, p. 99).  Explaining uneven entrepreneurial rates involves 
an inter-linked and segmented mix of personal and environmental factors (Shapero, 
1984; Borooah & Hart, 1999).  Malecki (1997) offers an overview of what could be 
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termed factorial approaches, the features of particular places which seem to promote 
entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurship arises because particular place-specific factors 
facilitate entrepreneurs being entrepreneurial, offering factors such as a good 
technological infrastructure, high-technology firms, skilled workers and finance 
capital. 
A factorial approach is useful at the regional level because it establishes a concrete 
link between entrepreneurship and territory; a territory possesses ‘assets’ (factors) and 
know-how about those assets; entrepreneurs configure these assets in new networks in 
creating new firms.  In turn, these new networks of firms sustain and add to the 
territorial asset base.  However, factorial approaches are not good at explaining the 
interdependence between the factors driving entrepreneurship (Mason, 1991; Borooah 
& Hart, 1999; Lawson, 1999; Saxenian, 2000).  Regional differences in 
entrepreneurship can also be thought of in terms of the way the factors cohere into the 
environment in which entrepreneurs operate.  Dubini (1989) classed good 
environments as ‘munificent’, whilst Johannisson (1993) used the idea of a ‘diverse’ 
environment to describe places with a higher tendency to new firm formation.  This 
perspective implies that geography matters, and that location — in some way more 
than the sum of these factors — affects entrepreneurial performance. 
A systems approach to understanding entrepreneurial environments 
If the way factors cohere is important, this raises the question of how entrepreneurship 
in peripheral regions, with poor entrepreneurial environments, can promote 
innovation and hence economic development.  A lack of entrepreneurial assets 
suggests that individual outcomes will be harder to achieve, and less likely to result in 
a fully munificent entrepreneurial system (Lawson, 1999; Hudson, 2002). I assume 
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that entrepreneurship promotes innovation, because of entrepreneurs’ key roles in 
building territorial networks.  Even if the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
innovation is only a tendency, it is a good first proxy for improved productivity. 
Rather than making a totalising shift from a sparse to a munificent environment, is it 
possible to quantify instead whether the environment is becoming more munificent?  
Johannisson et al. (2002) use the notion of ‘embeddedness’ to track and quantify the 
depth of interactions between firms in territories as an indicator of entrepreneurial 
environmental strength.  Social networking approaches use ‘trust’ and ‘untraded 
interdependencies’ as examples of assets which can build up and which are beneficial 
when they accrue precisely because they increase the productivity and 
competitiveness of local firms (Fukuyama, 1995; Klein Woolthuis, 1999).  Amin & 
Thrift (1994) suggest ‘institutional thickness’ to explain how evolutionary shifts in 
formal institutions and cultural norms affect economic development.  Bjarnar & 
Gammelsæter (2003) argue that it is the convergence between economic and social 
pressures for collaborative activity that promotes territorial economic success, and 
mapping the gap between functional and ethical cultures of collaboration quantifies 
progress through this development process. 
These approaches allow changes to be quantified, and an iterative accrual of these 
assets over time to correspond to an improvement in the entrepreneurial environment.  
Event-specific outcomes are broadened to become territorial collective competences 
more open to others in that particular territory (Lawson, 1999; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999).  Storper’s (1995) example of the creation of a ‘regional specialised labour 
market’ is beneficial because it allows others to benefit directly from the recruitment 
effort originally expended, without reincurring that expenditure.  Fontes & Coombes’ 
(2001) offered the notion of ‘densification of the techno-economic network’ (p. 84), 
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in referring to the process of universities and firms working together to create new 
innovation assets.  This idea of ‘densification’ provides a means to bridge between 
micro-scale activities and meso-level developments in particular regional economies. 
‘Densification’ is not a singular process, and it possible to think of a number of 
different dimensions along which network densification can vary.  Within any 
network, some densification involves actions on nodes, whilst some may involve 
actions on linkages.  The second variant in densification is whether the densification 
involves creating new elements (nodes or linkages) or increasing the strength of those 
that already exist.  Within a territorial entrepreneurial network, for example, a new 
joint venture represents a new node, whilst a new profit centre within an existing firm 
strengthens the existing node.  Likewise, in terms of linkages, a novel collaboration 
represents a new linkage, whilst changing the collaboration with a partner from 
product supply to co-development is a strengthening of that linkage.  This 2x2 scheme 
( {node, linkage}; {more, stronger} ) provides a means to explore the extent of 
densification activity involved in particular entrepreneurial networks. 
Methodology & analytic framework 
In this research, I am interested in whether a set of entrepreneurial activities have 
created cultural/ institutional regularities contributing to a densification of the 
entrepreneurial environment.  I use the densification scheme developed above to 
question whether densification in one particular entrepreneurial network was 
sufficiently extensive to warrant being regarded as a densification of the 
entrepreneurial environment.  My case study is of one sequence of spin-off firms 
which emerged over fifty years from one parent firm, Joyce-Loebl.  During its life, 
over forty firms were formed in the North East of England (a declining branch-plant 
In what sense ‘regional development?’: entrepreneurship, underdevelopment and strong tradition in 
the periphery 
10 
region) by individuals who had worked at one point for a firm earlier in the sequence.  
Figure 1 below provides an overview of the sequence and shows the distribution of 
new firm starts through the period.  My question is whether this superficially 
impressive network has changed the overall entrepreneurial environment of the North 
East of England in a way which can be regarded as a development [1]. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The four largest companies in the sequence are all externally owned by companies 
headquartered in various ‘sunrise’ regions (Massachusetts, Berkshire and California), 
suggesting a branch plant industrial structure underling the sequence.  Further 
complexity is added by the fact that these firms have been externally owned for long 
periods of time, without falling prey to stripping out and run-down predicted by 
branch-plant theories (Foley & Watts, 1996; Anderson, 2000).  A number of locally 
owned spin-offs experienced periods of rapid growth and became key players in 
particular high technology niches which could never be interpreted as reducing to 
some kind of ‘traditional’ asset. 
Rather than trying to decide whether one or other explanation best fits the facts, I 
consider how the observed sequence has moved the entrepreneurial environment 
between the two poles of ‘sparse’ and ‘munificent’ entrepreneurial environments. In 
the first stage of the analysis, I present a micro-scale analysis of the spin-offs over 
time, to examine the changes in the network which accompanied the formation of the 
companies. This forms the basis for a second-cut analysis focusing more closely on 
the types of network densification involved in these new firm formation processes, 
classifying the types of behaviour by which the spin-off companies have been 
produced.  I use this second-cut analysis to examine how the ‘vacant space’ of the 
North East has been occupied by an entrepreneurial network, to question whether 
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entrepreneurial events have created enduring territorial entrepreneurial assets in an 
otherwise weakly endowed environment. 
The research methodology 
My initial stimulus was that I found by chance that a number of electronics firms in 
the North East of England had had been established by founders who had worked for 
a relatively limited set of firms (Charles et al., 1997; 1998; Charles & Benneworth, 
1998; Potts, 1998).  In my study, I aimed to map all the companies emerging from the 
most fertile parent, to determine what had driven the sequence forward.  I sought to 
determine whether the sequence was in any way significant by theorising the events in 
terms of entrepreneurial explanations. 
Such a research project is inevitably grounded in realist methodologies, recognising 
that places containing similar underlying causal relations and structures will in 
practise appear different (Scott, 2000).  My approach was also informed by critiques 
of unselfconscious realism embedded in a number of ‘new regionalist’ analyses, in 
which empirical findings have been overly structured by theoretical frameworks, 
ignoring significant differences between places (Lovering, 1999; Hudson, 2003; 
Lagendijk, 2003).  In the paper, I have attempted to establish a single if partial history 
for the sequence, and using similarities in firms’ behaviour as hinting at potentially 
similar relationships in other similar places.  I use ‘entrepreneurial networks’ and 
‘environments’ as conceptual mechanisms for structuring relationships between 
phenomena.  I assume that similar phenomena are linked through similar underlying 
causes and structures, allowing analysis of the historical narrative through how 
successive generations of parent company lay the foundation for future 
entrepreneurial activities and new firms. 
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This paper draws on research undertaken between 1999 and 2002, which involved 
interviews with individuals who had established companies linked back to the parent 
firm, Joyce-Loebl, along with interviews with those involved with the start-up firms 
in other capacities, including joint venture partners, university collaborators and 
business support organisations.  The interviews were undertaken in two phases, 1999 
and 2000-02;  I performed 54 interviews over the two phases.  The interviews ranged 
in duration between one and four hours.  A number of other sources were used.  
Firstly, during the research I found a number of interesting documents, including a 
scrap-book of cuttings presented to the firm’s founder, Herbert Loebl, on his 
retirement from the business in 1974 (cf. endnote 6).  Secondly, the cuttings archive 
of the local newspapers (Journal and Chronicle) were used.  Thirdly, three 
interviewees had written memoirs of the company from their own perspective; 
Loebl’s (2001) was published, whilst Gordon Ridpath’s (2001) and Jimmy 
Hambleton’s (2002) much shorter documents were not.  Finally, a number of 
interviewees, notably Loebl, David Gurwicz, and Ridpath provided me with 
documents from their own archives. 
The firm and the region: exploring intuitive understandings 
The over-riding reason why the sequence in figure 1 above might be significant is that 
it is located in the North East of England, which is, in both economic and European 
spatial terms, a peripheral industrial region.  What is significant about the North East 
is its’ economic peripherality, a specific regional economic problem composed of 
several distinct elements, including its domination by mature manufacturing activity 
and branch plant employment, high levels of unemployment and a poor track record 
in entrepreneurship and technology development.  It is peripheral in this specific 
instance in terms of the European high-technology, high-productivity core (Sharp, 
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1998); core and peripheral are heuristics for referring to places with similar regional 
advantages and problems rather than a rigid spatial delineation. 
This regional problem emerged as a consequence of the North East’s early 
industrialisation, initiated in the 18th century by coal, and later through shipbuilding 
and steel.  Although for a time the North East led global markets in these industries, 
their ownership structure discouraged investment and innovation; the 20th century was 
a long period of run-down and closure for many firms (Hudson, 1995).  The 
government responded to this ongoing decline by creating Development Areas (1936) 
which targeted the attraction of inward investment, replacing lost jobs, but also 
reinforcing the anti-entrepreneurial culture in the North East (Charles & Benneworth, 
2001).  This manifests itself in the regional problem today; with 2.6m inhabitants and 
a per capita GDP of c. £10,000 (2000), the North East is both the least populated and 
the poorest British region, and repeatedly places very weakly in geographical surveys 
of entrepreneurship (cf. Mason, 1991, 1992). 
The firm in the region: a brief history of the firm 
The firm Joyce, Loebl and Co. was founded in 1951 [2] by two electrical engineers in 
the North East of England, Captain Robert Joyce [3], and Mr. (later Dr.) Herbert 
Loebl.  Both studied electrical engineering at King’s College, Durham (later part of 
Newcastle University).  Loebl was a member of a Jewish refugee family who had 
emigrated from Germany after their grandfather’s electrical business (Hugo Löbl 
Söhne GmbH) was expropriated in 1938 by the Nazi Government.  Loebl’s family 
had been dispersed to the North East as part of a Government evacuation scheme for 
Jewish businessmen willing to locate (and re-establish their former businesses) in 
Development Areas.  Loebl’s father and uncle together established a new firm 
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(Loblite) on the Team Valley Trading Estate.  Loebl took a degree in electrical 
engineering at King’s College, intending to work in Loblite after graduation.  Shortly 
after the war, Loebl Snr. died, and ‘after his death, Herbert Loebl decided to seek his 
fortune elsewhere’ [4], creating Joyce-Loebl with an acquaintance met through a 
former housemate. 
The firm was initially a small-scale operation, founded with £200 working capital in a 
lock-up garage, but growing very rapidly from 1953 onwards, when it won a large 
Government military electronics contract.  Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, 
the firm built up three joint ventures, two with local companies and one with the 
Italian optics company Optica.  The firm shifted in this time from low-technology to 
high-technology manufacturing, using the joint ventures to access new technologies 
as well as developing close linkages with universities to gain access to cheap research, 
problem-solving and consultancy activity.  This growth was interrupted — or at least 
changed in direction — in 1969, when the firm (and its remaining subsidiary joint 
venture) was bought out by Tech Ops, a US research-active firm with whom 
Joyce-Loebl had been collaborating for some years.  The worsening of Tech Ops’s 
financial position led them to separate Joyce-Loebl and Sevcon, and to sell 
Joyce-Loebl to Vickers (a filing-cabinets-to-fighting-vehicles conglomerate) in 1977.  
Sevcon focused its electric vehicles business around one component, the controller, 
divesting other related activities. Divestment took a decade to complete, and led to the 
formation of inter alia EVS, Temco and Nada (cf. Figure 1).  Tech Ops sold all its 
non-profitable businesses, and in 1988, Tech Ops sold all their other businesses 
except Sevcon, making Tech Ops a holding company for ‘Tech Ops Sevcon’ a 
Gateshead-based, AMEX-listed company [5]. 
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From 1977, Joyce-Loebl’s new parent (Vickers) chose also to divest their least 
profitable manufacturing assets, whilst trying to develop new products as cheaply as 
possible, achieved by developing successive products in close concert with a 
university.  This cheap but convoluted process left the firm leading the global market 
for computer image analysis in the early 1980s, but without a properly funded R&D 
programme (cf. Benneworth, 2001).  From 1985 to 1992, the company faced 
extremely turbulent times as Vickers sold the company to one group of managers, 
who in turn broke up the business for resale.  During this decade, a number of 
disgruntled engineers left to establish businesses in markets which they felt their 
managers were overlooking, in a number of sectors from biomedical reagent sales 
(M&I Scientific) to genetic imaging software (Non Linear Dynamics). 
A subset of the management buy-out team bought the defence assets, the biology 
imaging assets were sold to an American venture capital-backed shell company, 
Applied Imaging, and the industrial vision assets were sold to the Technical Director 
(see Appendix 1).  These last two new spin-offs were both formed from tangled 
groups of technologies, staff and organisations; one went through liquidation to sort 
out that mess, separating out a streamlined industrial vision business from a hostile 
spin-out.  Applied Imaging also gradually coaxed out a high-technology spin-off firm 
in a peripheral technological field, calcium fluorescence imaging.  By 2001, over 
forty firms had spun out from Joyce-Loebl and its children, employing around 1,000 
staff (cf. figure 1). 
Towards a first cut analysis: the value of a temporal sequencing. 
This narrative does not have a simple single message.  The parent company, 
Joyce-Loebl, has passed through multiple ownership, and is currently owned by a 
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Berkshire-based firm, Screen plc, perhaps suggesting that the assets are not strongly 
regionally embedded.  However, Joyce-Loebl is currently the only profitable part of 
Screen plc, implying the sequence is more than the run-down of local assets by 
external actors [5] (Firn, 1975; Anderson, 2000).  It could conversely be argued that 
in the course of the sequence, local actors enjoyed autonomy to thrive and develop 
new niche businesses which could not easily be stripped out.  In 1952 Joyce-Loebl 
might have seemed like an anomaly, by 1969 it had incubated three other firms, and 
by 2001 it was at the centre of a blossom of 46 spin-offs.  One way to gauge the 
significance is to look at whether the entrepreneurial network evolved over this time 
to be more dense, with more and stronger nodes and linkages. 
Joint ventures and early growth (1951-1969) 
The first phase in the formation of spin-offs came in the early years of the firm, as the 
company expanded very rapidly through a range of different collaborations, with 
universities for technical development and commercialisation, and with other 
businesses in the formation of joint ventures.  The company grew quickly during this 
period, imprinting two characteristics on the firm.  Firstly, because there were very 
few local companies capable of supplying components to the necessary quality, many 
activities had to be done in-house.  The company encompassed the full range of the 
production cycle, cutting metal, polishing glass, stoving paint finishes and wiring 
electrical harnesses (stronger node).  Secondly, the firm entered into a range of 
alliances with much larger partners who could provide resources to grow the business, 
and the company expanded into a group.  Two partnerships were with local electrical 
engineering firms; in each case Joyce-Loebl provided the technological development 
knowledge whilst the local firm provided the sales and marketing expertise, as well as 
much of the finance (new linkages). 
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In reality, each of these activities involved a mix of both new and stronger nodes and 
connections:- 
• System Computers was created to exploit analogue computer technology 
developed at the Sunderland Technical College for the nationalised electricity 
generating industry, as a joint venture with a local electrical engineering 
company (new node, new linkages, deeper linkages) 
• Sevcon was formed jointly with Smith’s Electric Vehicles (SEV), and then 
passed into sole ownership of Joyce Loebl (new node, stronger node, new 
linkages) 
• Optica (UK) was created as a third joint venture with the Italian firm Optica, 
but was closed after four years, with Joyce-Loebl taking over the imaging 
assets (stronger node, new linkages). 
In this first phase, Joyce Loebl used external linkages to create new local nodes within 
the entrepreneurial network (joint ventures and profit centres) as well as linkages 
(with universities, the Government and customers).  By the 1960s, these new spin-offs 
represented a significant amount of densification of the entrepreneurial network, a 
marked shift from the 1950s during which time the entrepreneurial network was 
entirely contained within the firm.  The joint ventures and collaborative culture 
created the basis for further future growth from four distinct major nodes.  In the three 
cases above, external partners were critical to the creation of these new firms as 
nodes, and they were underpinned by new and deeper linkages with partners and 
supportive agents; the failure of the Optica joint venture was precipitated by the 
Optica parent withdrawing support. 
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Retaining core focus (1969-1987) 
The second phase of spin-offs began with the sale of the firm in 1969, the departure of 
Herbert Loebl as MD and the necessity to provide profits to the new owners, Tech 
Ops.  The first spin-out of this period was driven by Joyce, who anticipated the 
cost-cutting intent of the new owners, and gave away the wiring shop to its’ foreman.  
The purchase by Tech Ops precipitated a wider change in management; the sales 
director (Chris Beadle) became MD in 1971 seeking to rid the company of its least 
profitable elements (the paint, metals and optics shops), a process which took until the 
mid-1980s.  These later divestments resembled Joyce’s 1969 divestment of the wiring 
shop; individuals were given whole parts of the business, and in return, assumed the 
responsibility for the employment of the staff.  A second simultaneous driver of 
spin-off came in the early 1980s recession, in which the firm experienced significant 
financial difficulties.  There was an extensive round of redundancies when those 
outside the core business were sacked.  Out of both these divestments and closures 
came a group of start-ups clustered during 1981-1985 (cf. figure 1).  The situation was 
similar in Sevcon, with both redundancies and divestments leading to the formation of 
a range of firms at this time. 
Within Joyce-Loebl, Beadle lacked resources to properly fund R&D.  In the early 
1970s, Joyce-Loebl developed a novel image analysis computer (Magiscan); they had 
worked closely with Manchester University which minimised development costs 
because they used a range of university and commercial grants to fund its 
development (new linkages).  The manner of that development demonstrated how few 
funds Tech Ops had available for R&D, and Vickers continued to deny fund to 
Beadle.  He was under pressure to sustain the technological position of the firm, 
developing new products without incurring significant expenditure.  To relieve this 
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pressure, he deepened the strategy of drawing on external partners’ R&D resources to 
cheaply build up assets and competitive advantage.  When Vickers refused to fund the 
next generation of Magiscan product development, Beadle arranged for the project 
team (a mix of academics and Joyce-Loebl employees) to do it in their spare time in 
return for a royalty agreement (effectively free of charge).  This project culminated in 
the very successful Magiscan 2 system, marking Joyce-Loebl’s full transformation 
into an image analysis company (stronger node). The creation of the Magiscan system 
greatly strengthened the entrepreneurial activity in Joyce-Loebl, with Paul Gregory 
creating a whole new project team which later formed the sole basis of the assets 
merged into Applied Imaging (new node).  This period can however be regarded as a 
period of renewal of the core focus of the most significant businesses. 
Many of the new firms formed in this period represented relatively limited 
densification; many of those marginalised by restructuring within the main firms 
continued their work by setting up their own firm.  In some cases, this strengthened 
the particular node; Stovright grew from four people in Joyce Loebl to a maximum of 
24 employees by the 1990s.  Indeed, many of the other spin-offs from this time did 
not change the shape of the network; typical of this was EVS, a Sevcon spin-off 
which created very little new activity by being spun-off.  EVS is, however, 
significant, as it indicates that Sevcon had become a major node in the network, 
thereby suggesting the network was qualitatively larger in the second period than in 
the first. 
Contesting gravitation to the core (1987-present) 
The third phase in the life of Joyce-Loebl came after 1987, when the second external 
owners of the firm, Vickers, sold the firm as part of a corporate re-organisation. From 
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1982, Vickers’ own precarious financial position meant that they were keen to offload 
the business.  In 1985 they entered into discussions with the Joyce-Loebl management 
team to sell them the business, a convoluted process which took six years to complete. 
During this convoluted disposal, they lost a number of their key staff, who were 
disappointed by the foregone technical opportunities, leading to the next wave of 
spin-off companies. 
Following  this period, Sevcon was reinvented as the headquarters for what remained 
of the Tech Ops group.  Applied Imaging bought out Joyce Loebl’s image analysis 
assets, spinning off the industrial imaging and defence assets to their respective 
managers (two spin-offs).  They integrated Joyce-Loebl with a competitor in the 
North East, changing the image analysis assets from being peripheral within a small 
engineering conglomerate to being an R&D site in a leading image analysis company.  
Other firms remained in the North East, although taken over by outside interests; 
although IRD was closed by Rolls-Royce in 1999, their industrial controls division 
(formerly Systems Computers) remained opened and technologically vibrant.  Nada 
was sold to Turbo Genset, a Canadian power engineering concern, which increased its 
Gateshead employment and R&D spending.   
This third phase can be regarded as an aggressive reassertion of the stripping-out 
process over the assets which had hitherto built up in the region.  The most stable 
elements of the entrepreneurial network, which best resisted the stripping out, were 
those elements which were already well embedded and interconnected.  By this stage, 
it is possible to identify five major nodes which were continuing to act as a source of 
new spin-off activities, alongside a much higher number of less dynamic firms:- 
• Joyce-Loebl, the defence systems became the core element of the group, and 
increased to 120 employees (strengthening node, new linkages) 
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• Sevcon, received new headquarters functions and responsibilities, and 
increased level of R&D spend (strengthening node, deeper linkages with local 
university), 
• Applied Imaging, new high technology company with R&D centre in the 
region which spun off a number of new firms (new and stronger nodes, 
stronger linkages), 
• Nada, continued growth even following takeover by Canadian firm (stronger 
node, new linkages), and 
• System Computers, closure of Rolls Royce Industrial Controls, but spin-off of 
two successor companies (new node, new linkages), one of which won a series 
of awards for its high-technology vehicle displays. 
Joyce-Loebl as a coherent development 
This first-cut analysis hints at a change in the nature of the entrepreneurial 
environment in the North East of England.  There is evidence that the network has 
grown, from one node in 1953 to five major nodes by 1992.  How does this 
correspond with a densification and embedding of a regional entrepreneurial 
environment? It is to this question that this paper now turns. 
The scale of activities seems to have increased over the fifty years of the sequence, 
with rapid initial growth followed by reorganisation and then further growth as the 
sequence matured.  However, the chronological sequence obscures events which do 
not fit neatly with the developmental phase in which they occurred.  Firms have been 
set up by individuals exploiting personal skills throughout the sequence, including 
Gordon Brooks Instruments (phase 1), Cassidy Scott Instruments, Curry & Maughan 
(phase 2) and Gilligan Engineering and Cellpower (phase 3).  To control for this 
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temporal structuring effect, in the second phase of the analysis, I instead focus on the 
strategies which individuals have used to create their companies, and relate the 
firm-based strategy to type of densification.  I classify the new firm formation process 
into three main mechanisms [7], representing three very different processes of 
densification, with three very different footprints upon the regional entrepreneurial 
environment. 
The least unexpected: firms set up by firms 
The first form of spin-out (fourteen of the 48 [8]) was the more formal 
‘intrapreneurial’ process, in which new businesses become institutionalised within 
parent companies and then divested to allow parent and child to pursue divergent 
paths (cf. Moncada-Paterno-Castello, 1999).  There were very few genuine 
‘intrapreneurial’ companies in the sequence; Sevcon was the only true one, and 
although a joint venture, was incubated within Joyce Loebl for a long period (qv).  
Although Systems Computers and Optica were similar in using existing Joyce-Loebl 
staff and partner funds, they were a degree removed from the parent company.  At a 
third level of remove as intrapreneurial businesses were those firms which were 
formed from particular assets which had once been integral to the firm, but were 
‘made’ into those assets into intrapreneurial businesses by handing over those assets 
to shop managers with medium-term supply contracts [9]. 
In short, the number of individuals enacting entrepreneurial behaviours was increased 
by creating well-connected new nodes in which individuals already sat.  They became 
entrepreneurs when the firm span out; the significant event was the preceding 
network-building within the parent firm.  By forming new companies within the 
boundaries of existing companies, the parents acted as incubators, mentors and 
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financiers for these new start-ups, building new nodes, embedding them in new 
linkages and compensating for the shortages of suitable support, advice and start-up 
finance in the North East of England.  With the intrapreneurial spin-offs, the barriers 
to individuals enacting entrepreneurial repertoires were lowered; given bundles of 
assets (well-linked nodes), the parent companies effectively incubated the firm and 
facilitated the entrepreneurial event. 
What the spin-off process did was to free the firm from the resources of its parent, 
allowing it to grow, and allowing it to develop new linkages (cf. 
Lindholm-Dahlstrand, 1999).  Some of these firms did subsequently grow and 
succeed, building new links with universities and suppliers, to become significant 
parent nodes in their own right (such as Sevcon, Nada and Applied Imaging).  This 
seems to suggest that becoming an entrepreneur in a peripheral region is difficult but 
not impossible, involving building nodes in the entrepreneurial system.  In several 
cases (e.g. from Sevcon), further (non-intrapreneurial) spin-offs emerged from 
individuals who had become entrepreneurs through an intrapreneurial event [10]. 
 ‘Smash and grab’: the antagonistic spin-outs 
The second form of spin-out (ten from 48) can be characterised as being antagonistic 
or hostile spin-outs, by individuals who became marginalised as the parent companies 
consolidated their foci.  In each of the cases, the bundle of assets the entrepreneur 
began with was rather more denuded than in those cases above of spun-out 
operational business units.  The spin-off process did not densify the networks per se, 
but saved the assets from dissolution, therefore at least preserving the network’s size.  
A number of individuals found it easy to take assets (skills, customers and 
technologies) formed in the business, without significant resistance from the parent.  
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There have been periods in this sequence when the parent companies have themselves 
(and by their managers’ own admissions) been badly managed, and the antagonistic 
spin-outs have preserved assets jeopardised by weak management.  This had a 
territorial benefit, embedding those assets more strongly in regional systems.  This is 
a sustaining rather than a growth mechanism, preserving elements of the network 
within the region, although not visibly improving the density of that network. 
This emphasises that the constraints of peripherality are negotiable, and that ‘core’ 
actors do not always control and/ or strip out all the key assets.  In some cases, 
external actors abandoned particular assets, especially during plant or operation 
closure, allowing local actors to negotiate their preservation through re-embedding 
them in the regional entrepreneurial networks, outside the parent.  Thus, although the 
sequence in figure 1 does not show this, the antagonistic spin-outs densified the 
regional environment to the extent of assembling particular regional financial, 
technological and management support assets outwith the parent node. 
Aggregating to the regional scale, we might have expected a peripheral region to lose 
many smaller nodes, but the system seems more self-sustaining than this. Although 
the sequence is not a totalising shift in the organisation of production from 
‘branch-plant’ to ‘technopolis’, it does suggests a second-tier form of network 
dynamic which represents a densification beyond the bounds of the existing network.  
Moreover, it questions the value of a binary division (‘core’/ ‘periphery’) for 
exploring power and control in entrepreneurial networks; ‘peripheral’ actors clearly 
enjoyed a degree of autonomy, and were not forced into roles dictated by dominant 
external actors. 
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The tension of the traditional: new markets for old skills? 
The third type of spin-off (fifteen of 48) were those formed by individuals who had 
particular skills on which they sought to capitalise.  These differed from the 
antagonistic firms in taking away very little from the parent node.  These newly 
formed firms had the loosest connections back to their parent companies, and were 
variously a consequence of redundancy, retirement, or disenchantment with their 
current occupations.  Given that these firms began with the smallest bundles of assets 
from the parent, it is unsurprising that they also achieved the least.  At least ten of the 
firms formed in this way experienced succession problems and were unlikely to 
outlive the retirement of their founders, suggesting that they were not involved in 
strengthening regional networks.  In a number of cases, firms were formed some time 
after their founders had worked at Joyce-Loebl, and the technologies with which those 
firms worked were typically related to their more recent employments.  The linkages 
of these individuals back to the parent nodes in the entrepreneurial network are the 
weakest, often limited to witnessing the past success of other companies in the 
sequence.  In that regard, this is densification in which individuals are able to attach 
themselves to the network, albeit very loosely, extending slightly the scope of the 
network. 
These type of firms can be regarded as traditional, following Anderson, because of 
their regional use of ‘left over qualities … that made it peripheral in the first place’.  
They are ‘traditional’ in two senses; firstly in having a pre-Fordist essence, being 
what Loebl called ‘technological artisans’ (2001, p. 72); secondly, they had skills 
unique to the region either through its history or forgotten elsewhere.  These types of 
businesses tend to be characterised in negative ways in regional development analyses 
– lifestyle, dead-end, hobby, satisficing (inter alia Coe & Townsend, 1998; Keeble & 
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Nachum, 2002), hiding that many firms did not use ‘traditional’ technologies, but 
high technology fields such as electronic controls, nuclear power and industrial 
vision.  Secondly, as new nodes formed and grew, ‘left-over qualities’ were 
transformed into entrepreneurial assets, strengthening the overall network, embedding 
those entrepreneurs in the regional economy. 
The relationship of peripherality and entrepreneurship 
All three types of firm contributed differently to the densification of the network, and 
all suggested they had broader territorial impacts beyond the particular sequence:- 
• Antagonistic firms helped condition regional financial, technological and 
managerial assets,  
• Technological artisans embedded themselves in the regional economy with a 
stronger sense of entrepreneurship than had they been working in large firms,  
• Key larger ‘node’ firms acted as sources of the other two types of firm, as well 
as building and developing strong linkages with local technological actors, 
especially universities and technical centres. 
The densification process is thus more diverse than anticipated at the outset; different 
types of real activity with distinct impacts on the entrepreneurial environment all 
combined elements of the four archetypal densifications (new node, stronger node, 
new linkage, stronger linkage).  Big events involving three or four types of 
densification initiated the observed sequence, with other smaller-scope (one or two 
elements of densification) sustaining and embedding the network, changing its shape 
and slightly extending its scope.  A few entrepreneurial events created a critical mass 
driving larger changes: the question is the extent to which this can be considered an 
improvement in the entrepreneurial environment. 
In what sense ‘regional development?’: entrepreneurship, underdevelopment and strong tradition in 
the periphery 
27 
These assets do have a broader scope than the firms who have created them, which 
arises from the fact that they have been created by interactions with external agents – 
financial, corporate, academic — without allowing those external agents to dominate 
their activities and strip them out from the region.  This durability is a key aspect of 
the sequence, because despite all the changes of ownership, the network continued to 
deepen and grow in the region.  In all three types of firm, ‘tradition’ featured in the 
creation of the firms, fixing nodes firmly in the regional economy.  Even in the 
intrapreneurial firms, those businesses included traditional elements, particularly 
integrated high-technology design and manufacturing activity.  This gave the newly 
founded firms a strong location within the region; in this sense, peripherality can be 
an asset when creatively combined by entrepreneurs to fix networks in place. 
In this paper, I have focused on firms as the analytic unit, but other elements of 
entrepreneurial environments have benefited from the presence of the sequence.  
Local universities have benefited greatly from this sequence, creating novel 
university-based assets on which other firms have drawn (Benneworth, 2001).  At 
least nine[11] of the firms were adept at going into universities and making them do 
new things to their benefit, quite different to universities being the source of 
high-science content spin-off firms (Fontes & Coombs, 2001).  The sequence also 
solidified particular forms of finance, creating local private capital [12], encouraging 
national venture funds to have local agents, and in helping local firms access global 
equity funds. 
This suggests that ‘denser entrepreneurial environments’ are stimulated in events 
which take a range of assets and which reconfigure them in a way which extends the 
scope of the networks.  By blending unique and general assets, some firms were able 
to create assets which were sufficiently embedded or anchored in the region to be self 
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sustaining even under external ownership.  This helps to refine the issue of why those 
assets are resistant to gravitation; being built by blending in specifically local features 
to high technology assets, those assets cannot easily be stripped out.  This blending 
process has created new entrepreneurial assets in the regional environment which can 
be available for others to use, creating regional development benefits.  The apparent 
small scale of the outcomes densified in particular regions does not necessarily mean 
they are insignificant.  Once a network with several growth nodes emerged, then it 
was easier for smaller scale activities to constellate around those leaders, building the 
network through discrete new linkages. Through this uptake and use, the culture 
became (recognised as being) more entrepreneurial (Bjarnar & Gammelsæter, 2003). 
The second feature of the analysis is that not all the assets in the entrepreneurial 
network had previously been identified in factorial taxonomies of denser 
entrepreneurial environments.  Features associated with peripherality (i.e. currently 
regarded as negative) have been used by entrepreneurs in a positive way in 
establishing their firms.  It is only because the microdensitometer design did not 
change substantially over forty years that one business received a guaranteed income 
stream for servicing and maintenance which was invested in new R&D activities.  
Likewise, although the ‘technological artisans’ firms could be portrayed as 
inconsequential hobby businesses, they were better than the obvious alternative which 
was employment of those technicians in large, anti-entrepreneurial branch-plants.  
This can be understood by restating the negative factor in terms of the way it has been 
used as a peripheral region-specific anchor.   
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Concluding discussion 
It is very difficult to draw firm conclusions, because there is still a gulf between the 
scale of the sequence in this paper and that of the regional economy [13].  Bearing 
this in mind, it is possible to pursue two avenues in using this peripheral sequence to 
refine our understandings of entrepreneurship and regional development.  Given that 
this is a single study of a single sequence in a single region, only limited claims can 
be made to the generality of the findings.  Notwithstanding these constraints, the first 
finding is that entrepreneurship is more than an emergent property of successful 
regions.  The sequence of entrepreneurship in the North East did have elements of the 
dynamic, self-reinforcing and productivity-raising qualities observed in more 
successful regions.  This happened in two ways, firstly by improving the 
innovativeness of existing assets, but also increasing the scope of entrepreneurial 
networks and allowing other participants to benefit from those networks.  
Embeddedness was an important feature of the network, with traditional assets 
approximating to some kind of informal institution (cf. Johannisson et al., 2002).  
Although the North East retained some tradition, this does not mean that the 
entrepreneurial businesses in the region necessarily had ‘second-best’ qualities; rather, 
as entrepreneurial environments built up around the traditional background, those 
peripheral qualities were actively reconstituted by entrepreneurs as beneficial 
territorial assets. 
Secondly, and related to this, is that factorial analyses of entrepreneurship may have 
much to learn from the micro-level analysis of entrepreneurship in peripheral regions.  
Although exemplar analyses capture many features of entrepreneurial environments, 
this research suggests that some factors which are present in core regions may be 
obvious as factors only in less successful regions.  Thus, although plant closure may 
In what sense ‘regional development?’: entrepreneurship, underdevelopment and strong tradition in 
the periphery 
30 
drive entrepreneurial activity in Cambridge or Maryland, academic analyses tend to 
focus on the strong venture capital markets and supportive infrastructure in these 
regions, overlooking the role of closure in the entrepreneurial event (Wicksteed, 2000; 
Franklin et al., 2002) [14].  Given that the canon of exemplar regions is continually 
evolving, factorial categorisations also evolve and co-opt their features into existing 
factorial frameworks.  There is thus scope to examine how these ‘negative’ events and 
factors have positive outcomes; less successful regions are good laboratories in this 
regard because their histories are dominated by ‘negative events’. 
The assets I have identified are undoubtedly derived from the strengths of the existing 
regional economic base - the North East has built genuinely global expertise in 
genetic image analysis, both academically and commercially.  However, these 
micro-scale strengths are easily dismissed as being ‘weak’ at a meso/ regional scale.  I 
argue that this suggests tradition has acted as a strong variable, as a positive feature in 
entrepreneurship in the North East of England.  The economic strength is the 
uniqueness and innovativeness of their products and processes, but partly derives 
from factors found in the North East of England as a less munificent entrepreneurial 
environment.  Although a few significant events – involving many types of 
densification – were necessary to trigger the development of the entrepreneurial 
network, their impact was greatest when they allowed the broadest range of local 
entrepreneurs to draw on the assets within the network, blurring the boundary 
between the entrepreneurial network and entrepreneurial environment.  This is best 
exemplified by the ‘unique skills’ start-ups, who drew on the entrepreneurial 
demonstrations of former entrepreneurs in setting up their own businesses.  Whilst 
these were not a great addition to the entrepreneurial network, they were a more 
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significant addition to the overall (sparse) entrepreneurial environment of the North 
East of England. 
The challenge for factorial approaches to entrepreneurship is then to produce a 
grammar and language of (meso-scale) regional development and entrepreneurship 
which can encompass the ‘strength’ of peripheral assets.  How then can we map out 
the directions in which future research might explore this potential of ‘strong 
traditionalisation’ to capture the invisible entrepreneurship assets in the periphery?  
Such a project would require a reappraisal of the development potential of assets 
understood in such value-laden terms as branch-plants, mass-production cultures and 
peripheral regions, and examining the potential in these activities to produce ‘anchors’ 
resistant to gravitation which entrepreneurs can use to innovate and raise productivity.  
It is possible to evaluate the role of particular non-core features by examining the way 
in which they are incorporated into successful ventures.  Critically, there is potential 
for these kinds of assets to promote entrepreneurship more generally across different 
types of territory.  This seems to provide a means to further expand the factorial 
categorisations of geographies of entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurship in peripheral 
regions is complex, contingent and uncertain, but that complexity potentially offers a 
mechanism to explore more closely the general relationships underlying 
entrepreneurship and regional development. 
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Endnotes 
[1] To reiterate, my model of economic development is in creating new assets which make it easier for 
other firms to access the types of assets they need to innovate, and ultimately increase the productivity 
of their knowledge capital. 
[2] Although the mistake was frequently repeated in the press that the company was founded in 1952, 
Loebl insists that the firm was founded in 1951. 
[3] It has not been possible to trace and speak to Joyce, with the result that Loebl comes through as the 
much more active of the two founding partners in the narrative.  However, the majority of the 
interviewees who had been at JL before 1974 (Loebl’s departure) concurred that Loebl was the more 
influential of the two in company decisions. 
[4] This phrasing in quotation marks was agreed with Herbert Loebl on 30th January 2003 to as the best 
way of encompassing what had happened. 
[5] AMEX is the American Stock Exchange. 
[6] Screen plc experienced problems with profitability, including having trading in its shares suspended 
from the UK’s Alternative Investment Market in 2002.  There was a change of management, and the 
renegotiation of its share relisting and banking facilities were contingent on the performance of 
Joyce-Loebl within the group. ‘Screen, parent of Tyneside screen developer is returning to the 
Alternative Investment Market after an 11-week suspension … It is clearly that acquisition of 
Joyce-Loebl in Gateshead last year that transformed the position” The Journal (qv), ‘Screen on market 
and ready to go forward’ December 18th 2002, p.27. 
[7] There is a fourth, merger and take-over, which involved negligible entrepreneurship, and which was 
primarily a technical/ accounting fix; no further spin-offs emerged from merger-take-over spin-offs. 
[8] The 48 comprises the 46 spin-off firms, Joyce-Loebl itself, and Loblite, (the grandparent firm).  The 
link to Loblite was that his father’s death had left his mother well provided for through the father’s 
various successful businesses in Germany and the UK, and she provided them with a relatively small 
investment. 
[9] Only one of those companies, Washington Optics, actually failed; around half maintained their level 
of performance, and two of the more leading edge firms managed to achieve high levels of growth. 
[10] David Gurwicz, for example, was involved in the separation of Sevcon from Joyce-Loebl, and then 
set up a number of other businesses, two of which — at the time employing 40 staff — were later sold 
off to a Canadian power engineering firm. 
[11] Sevcon, Non Linear Dynamics, Applied Imaging, Nada, Micro-Technology, D&N Consulting, 
Foster Findlay, JL Automation, Joyce-Loebl 
[12] When one owner sold up, he became a significant business angel, and was also instrumental in 
getting together with other business angels in the North East to create a business angels network, which 
in turn increased the accessibility of venture finance in the North East.  The network he created 
outlived his eventual departure from the management position.  In terms of accessing global equity 
markets, two firms are listed on US bourses; Applied Imaging is listed on NASDAQ as AICX, and 
Tech Ops Sevcon is listed on AMEX as TOS. 
[13] There is a further unresolved issue of how long opportunities remain available for entrepreneurs to 
re-embed in the periphery before they are stripped-out through gravitation. 
[14] Wicksteed (2000) analyses the Cambridge (UK) biotechnology and electronics industries, telling 
the story in such a way that the closure of two firms, Pye Laboratories and Cambridge Instruments, are 
seen as being positive, despite both being negative events.  Likewise, in Maryland, USA,  Franklin et 
al. (2002) relate the case of Life Technologies Inc (LTI), a local company bought out and closed down 
by Californian rivals (i.e. framed as a peripheral event in a core region).  ‘As Mark Berninger, a former 
LTI employee who has started a new company called AnhydroCyte, Inc., puts it, 'I believe strongly that 
the net affect [sic] of the Invitrogen acquisition will be more jobs in the local area, not fewer.” ’ 
(Franklin et al., 2002, p. 2). 
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Figure 1 The intrapreneurial sequence of the Joyce-Loebl spin-out family. 
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